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Ixsunexcn Co¡vsumnn CouNsEL's Corunnu
ExposrNc "ILLUSoRy" Unnrmnsunno Motonrst Covnnecr
¡v Pno¡'essox Cnnc Mu¡¡no
httoúlction
Plaintiff 's counsel is Iikely famil-
iar v¡ith the problem of "illusory''
UIM coverage. The client, who has
been severely infured by the negli-
gence of an auto driver, presents in
the office terrified by the mounting
medical bills. Counsel is relieved to
fìnd that the tortfeasor has insurance,
and the client prudently purchased
Underinsuted Mototist coverage. The




age limit for which the insured has
been paying a premium. However,
counsel's relief turns to ftustration
when he or she determines that, in
spite of counsel's best efforts, under
the terms of the UIM coverage or
endorsement, no UIM benefìt is go-
ing to be payable because the UIM
limit doesnt exceed the amount the
client will teceive from the tortfeasor
or tortfeasors. In another variation of
this scenario, the client presents with
$25,000 UIM coverage, and, under
the terms of the polic¡ counsel can
fìnd no situation in which any benefìt
would ever be payable!
The problem is caused by the
policy's definition of Undednsured
Motor Vehicle and, sometimes, by a
companion "reducing clause." For
ouf pufposes, there afe two very
different definitions of Underinsured
Motor Vehicle fhat are in wide use by
automobile insurance carriers in
Montana today. One, which I will call
the "narro#'1 definition most cer-
tainly produces an "illusory" cover-
age that is the subject of this article.
In the case of lIørdlt a. Pntgressíue
Sþecíølty Ins. Co.2 pending at the
Montana Supreme Court, the insured
Hardy seeks to have the offending
illusory "nattow" UIM definition
declared invalid. MTI.A member,
I(ent Duckworth of Ronan has chal-
lenged the definition, and Randy
Bishop and I briefed the position of
Amicus MTLÂ on this issue as well
as the "stacking" issue presented in
this column last quarter. Both were
argued in II ørd.y on January 23, 2003.
TheUIMdefinítions
The "nattow" coverage UIM
definition is used by Progressive
Specialty fnsurance Company and
some other companies in Montana
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and defines án "underinsured motor-
ist" as one whose tiability limits are
less than the limits of the injured
insured's UIM coverage. For example,
Progressive's UIM coverage provides:
"Underinsured motor vehicle,,
means a land motor vehicle or
trailer of any rFpe to which a
bodily iniury liability bond or
policy applies at rhe time of
the accident, but the sum of
all applicable limits of liability
for bodily injury is less than
the coverage limit for Under-
insured Motorist Coverage
shown on the Declarations page.
Other auto insurers use the
"I)toad"3 defìnition that defines UIM
as the difference between the
tortfeasor's limits of liability and the
insured's tort damages. For instance,
State Farm's policy provides:a
Underinsured Motor Vehicle _
means a land motor vehicle:
1. The ovtnership, maintenance or use
of which is insured or bonded for
bodily injury liability at the time of
the accidenq and
2, whose limits of liability for bodily
injury liability:
a. are less than the amount of the
insured's damages; or
b. have been reduced by payments
to pefsons other than the
insured to less than the amount
of the insured's damage.
The two defìnitions are pro-
foundly different in their application.
The "broad" coverage definition is
insurance-consumer friendly and
provides a solid benefit whenever the
insured's damages exceed the BI
coverage availal¡le. The "narrow"
coverage definition used by Progres-
sive and others provides an illusory
coverage often entirely defeated by its
own teÍms. That coverage defìnition
is made even \¡/orse when coupled
with a "reducing clause" which re-
duces any UIM benefìt by any BI
benefits paid the injured insured by
any tortfeasor. (Ihe "reducing
clause" problem will be discussed
later in this article.)
Illustrating tlre problem
To best illusúate the illusory
nature of the coverage caused by the
flarrow definition, let us consider the
situation of the insured who has
purchased $25,000 UIM coverage
with the narrow defìnition. The fol_
lowing are five inescapable truths
about that situation:
First, regardless of the insured,s
UIM limit, if the tortfeasor has no
lìability insurance, it is a UM claim
and the UIM witl provide no benefìt.
Second, if by chance, an out-of-
state vehicle ddven in Montana had
BI limits less than 925,000, then that
vehicle is deemed an "uninsured
motor vehicle" under Ole son u,
.Førmers In)s. Group,s so thereis no
UIM benefit. Progressive,s policy
excludes "uninsured" vehicles from
UIM coverage. This is important
because some courts, while grasping
for straws to avoid finding the cover_
age "illusory" have held it could
conceivably provide UIM coverage
for out-of-state vehicles v¡ith BI tim-
its lower than those required by the
state fìnancial responsibility act. See,
for example, the Indiana court,s deci-
sion tn Merídíøn Mut fns. Co. o.
Ricltie.6 However, there is no such
benefìt ro support rhe use of the
clause in Montana, since, under
Olcson, the UIM will not apply.
Third, if the insured has
$25,000 limits of UIM in Montana,
because Montana motorists are all
required to carry $25,000 mandatory
tiability limirs, there is no way ro
fecover, since by the ..narrow,, defi-
nition, there can be no
"underinsured motorist.,, (If you
object that we all know many Mon_
tanans don't carry insurance in spite
of the law, remember: If they don,t,
they are uninsured motorists defeat-
ing any UIM benefits.)
Fourth, in fact, if the insured has
purchased 925,000 UIM, regardless
of the limit of the tortfeasor,s BI
coverage or the extent of the insured,s
damages, there can be no UIM ben-
efit payable under this "narrow,,
definition.
Fifth, regardless of rhe facr rhar
the Declarations page shows $25,000
UIM coverage, there is no way to
recover a single dollar of benefìts
under the narrow definition. The
insured has paid premiums for nothing.
Court Treatment of the,.Naffou¡,'
UIMDefinition
Consequently, some courts have
invalidated the narrow coverage UIM
definition. For insrance, while the
Montana Supreme Court has not yet
decided rhe issue, Judge Lovell, writ-
ing for the Federal District Court,
declared rhe narrow defìnition invalid
n Trans ømericø hts. Gttttþ a,
Osbornin 1986.7 There, the injured
Osborn obtained a stz¡te court iudg-
ment for fiL87,333.1.9 and secured
$125,000 in Bodily Injury liability
coverage from the car and driver that
hit him. Osborn personaþ carried
$50,000 UIM coverage that utilized
the narrow definition. Consequentl¡
Transamerica took the position that
the other vehicle v/as not an
underinsured motor vehicle.
Judge Lovell noted rhat the Dec-
larations page of Osborn,s policy
showed 950,000 ìimits for UIM.
However, he noted:
The underinsured motorist
coverage will be triggered only
when the vehicle involved car-
ries insurance of at least
$25,000 but less than g50,000.
In the final anaþsis, under no
set of circumstances v/ilI
Transamedca be liable for
more than $25,000 under the
underinsured motorist provi-
sions of the policy.
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Consequentl¡ he found the nar- equal to or gteater than but less expectations with regard to UIM
row definition of UIM void as than $25,000 per person and coverage.
against public policy in Montana for $50,000 per accident.lo In Bennetta. Støte Før-mMut,
violating the reasonable expectations Auto. fns. Co.,1a the court said:
of the insured that he had purchased The coutt could not reconcile the
$50,000 of UIM coverage. Declarations page "which ostensibly Montana citizens should have
However, Magistrate Judge shows the limits of a separate a reasonable expectation that
,{.nderson, in Scbøntz o. Geì.co Gen underinsured motorist coverage" when they purchase separate
Ins. øttd.Fa"rtnersAllìanceMut and the policy language and refused policies for underinsured mo-
1zs.r8 recently revier¡¡ed the torist coverage, they will
narrow definition of an teceive adequate com-
underinsured motor ve- That COUft'S hOlding iS COnSiStent pensation for losses
hicle and, applying
tract pdnciples without any insured motorist, up to
discussion of Montana fecognition of the insufenGe the aggregate 1imits of
public polic¡ let it stand to cOnSUmef'S feAsgneble expectetiOnS the policies they have
deny UIM coverage to the r - r_ _-- _ _¿ t^ ! rr¡r -^:-^---^ purchased.
insured. As mentioned w¡th fegetd to UIM covefage.
eadieq the Montana Su-
preme Court, which is not
The court's quoted
statement in Bennett pro-
bound by the decisions in Osborn or
Scbøntzis facing the issue squarely
in the pending case of llardy u.
Prcgressfue.
In Minnesot a, in I:Ioe s ch en o.
S.C, Ins. Co.e the court had to apply
a Nortlr Carohna UIM statute and
policy language both of which used
the narrow defìnition of UIM. The
insured's UIM limit and the
tortfeasor's BI limit were each
$25,000. The coutt noted that, under
the applicable North Carohna statute
(as in Montana under Oleson),autos
insured with limits of less than
$25,000/$50,000 ate uninsured mo-
tor vehicles and could not qualify for
UIM. To be "underinsured," the
court found required that the policy
be at least $25,000/$50,000. The
coutt said in frustration:
It seems to us perfectly clear
that although the declaration
sheet of Hoeschen's policy
states that it provides under-
insured motorist coverage with
limits of $25,000 each person
and $50,000 each accident, it is
impossible for any motor vehicle
to fit the policy definition of an
underinsured motor vehicle: a
vehicle insured to liability limits
to resolve the conflict "to totally
eliminate underinsured motorist
coverage from the poLicy." Accord-
ingl¡ the justices held that the UIM
defìnition "entitles its insured to
benefìts to the extent his damages
exceed the liability coverage of the
defendant, not exceeding the policy
limits of the insured's policy." In
esserìce, the court construed the illu-
sory natro-ü/ coverage UIM to be
broad coverage UIM,11
In the Wisconsin case of
Iloglund.a. Securø. fns.,12 r},e
court held the narrow defìnition
rendered such UIM covetage illu-
sory because there were no circum-
stances under which Hoglund could
recover the benefìts. In Hoglund, as
in many cases, the policy itself said
that a tortfeasor insured for a limit
less than the fìnancial responsibiliry
law's minimum was an uninsured
motorist so that, as in Montana,
even the driver with a $15,000 limit
of liability v¡ould not fìt the defini-
tion of UIM. The court held the
narrow definition is "inconsistent
with the insured's reasonable expec-
tations."13 That court's holding is
consistent with the Montana Su-
preme Coutt's recognition of the
insurance consumer's reasonable
tected the insured's expectation of
receiving the benefit of multiple UIM
coverage limits through "stacking."
One would expect that the court
vzould protect the insured's expecta-
tion to teceive something more than
illusory coverage when a single UIM
policy is involved.
ln lønd.ís u. Am. fns. Exclt.,ls
anlndiana appellate court held in the
same minimum limits circumstances
that the narrow defìnition violated
"as a, rnatter of larv the public policy
interest which disfavors illusory cov-
etage,"16 "Síhere an othefwise unam-
biguous insurance clause provides
only illusory coverâge when con-
strued within the insurance contract
in its entirery the courts of this state
will enforce the provision so as to
give effect to the reasonable expecta-
tion of the insured."17 The coutt
ruled that, since the declarations page
of the Landis's insurance policy pro-
vided $25,000 limits of UIM, it was
reasonable for the insuted to expect
the limit was available for his dam-
ages.,\s in lfoescben, the court
treated the narrow coverage provision
as though it was the broad coverage.
MCA 535-15-316 (1985) provides
that "Every insurance contract shall
be construed according to the entirety
Pecn 3O Tnrer Tnnxns - 'Wnvrnn 2OO3
t h e se citcumstances, she
could recover nothing un-
der any other set of facts."
The court found the nar-
row defìnition violative of
the basic insurance prin-
ciple, saying:
Is not the very essefrce
of insurance the as-
sumption on the part of
the insuter, for avalu-
of its terms and conditions as set
forth in the policy..," just as the
Iønd.ís court did.
In invalidating the narrow cover-
age UIM defìnition in another mini-
mum limits case, the Supreme Cout
of Alabama, nSmòth a. Auto-Own-
ers Ins. Co.,18 said, "Not only can
the insured recover nothing under
UIM limits, regardless of their
amount, turn out to be equal to or
less than the BI Liability limits of the
tortfeasor. In fact, Progressive's nar-
row defìnition has been slightly modi-
fìed from the ISO drafting so that the
insured's UIM limit is compared to
"all applicable limits of liability for
bodily injury" instead of "its limit of
The narÍow UltUl coverage definition
also proyides illusory coverage for ühe
entire class of insureds wlrose Uflll
lirnits, regardless of their Amount,
turn out to Þe equal to or less than the
Bt LiaÞility limits of the tortfeasor.
liability" (refering to the BI liability
limit on the underinsured motot
vehicle). Hence, in any case where all
other LiabiJity limits equal or exceed
the insured's UIM limit, the insured
receives no UIM benefìt regardless
of his darnages.
This last class of frustrated
insureds is denied any benefìt fot
their UIM premiums, even if the
insured didn't personally recover the
amount of BI Liability covetage that
negated his or her UIM benefits.
Consequently,'at Førmers Ins, Co,
of I døIt o a, Buffø,21 the court held
that, where four injured vehicle occu-
pants split the tortfeasor's single BI
Iiability limit of $100,000, the
$100,000 UIM limit on the car in
v¡hich they were riding was ruled
unavailable to them, since the
tottfeasot's vehicle was not
"underinsured" undet the narrow
coverage definition,22 Similad¡ in
Nøtionøíde Mut Ins. Co. a.
Scadcttr23 the tortfeasor had a BI
liability limit of $100,000 and the
insuted had four vehicles each in-
sured for $100,000 UIM, and the
court held there was no UIM benefìt
under the narrov/ coverage definition.
In State Førtn Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
a. Me s s ðnger, 2a the tortfeasor's
$300,000 BI liability limit was allo-
cated $290,000 to a catastrophically
injured occupant of the auto and
$5,000 each to injured husband and
wife co-occupants. Their $300,000
UIM coverage was held to be un-
available to them since, under the
natrow coverage definition, the
tortfeasor wasn't
"undetinsured" tegardless
of their tiny recovedes. In
evefy case mentioned
above, the insured could
have recovered under the
"broa,d" coverage UIM





able considetation, of certain
risk of loss on the part of the




provide "coverage" for which
the insuret can never be liable?
We think these questions are
self-answering. Surel¡ these
facts involve the application of
the "reasonable expectation"
doctrine.
Meeting the "reasonable expecta-
tions" of the insured, the court man-
dated that the insurer provide the
amount of UIM coverage shown on
the declarat-ions page.lo
In Gla.z ew s kö a. AIßt øte Ins.
Co.,20 the Illinois Âppellate Court
held that, under the nartow UIM
provision, the sale of minimum limits
of UIM in a state with the same
minimum mandatory liability limit
not only is the sale of "illusory"
coverage, but can be the basis for a
class action for fraud and for viola-
tion of the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act for all those who put-
chase the coYerage.
The narrow UIM coverage defi-
nition also provides illusory covetage
for the entire class of insureds whose
Søfeco Ins. Co. ofAm-,2s asavthor-
ity for their position that the nârrow
clause is vahd. Stutzmø.n, how ever, is
irrelevant to the validity of the clause.
,{.t issue in Stutztnønwas the validity
of a famlly exclusion to the "broad"
coverage UIM de{ìnition. The broad
coverage defìnition of UIM does not
result in illusory coverage. Stutztnøn
upheld a farnlly exclusion to broad
form UIM coverage against a claim
that it violated public policy. The
court found no public policy viola-
tion in the exclusion because it was
desþed to prevent insureds ftom
using cheaper UIM coverage as a
form of BI coverage.26
It is true that Stutzmøn søsd,
"[e]xpectations that are corattany to a
cleat exclusion from coverâge aÍe not
'objectively reasonable'." Citing
Wellcome, 257 Mont. At 359, 849
P.2datl94.There is no clear exclu-
sion involved in this issue. Instead,
the insurer has created a sttuctural
policy ambiguity because the "nar-
row" coverage definition of UIM and
the reducing clause appear in com-
plete conflict with the declaration
page's promise of a cettain dollar
amount of UIM limits. Carriets also
rcly on Am" Førní.ly Mut Ins. Co. u.


















Lùuengoodr2? but, the issue there was
whether the household exclusion to
the liabiliw coveraEe violated oublic
policy. Review of the case shows no
relevance to the issue of the illusory
nature of the narrow UIM defìnition,
The Montana Supteme Court has
applied the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to consumers of UIM
covenge'tn Bennett ù, Støte Førtn
Mut Ins. Co.28 and Støte Førrn
Mut Auto. Ins. Co. a. Estøte of
Brøun2e In both cases, the court
afftmed that Montana public poìicy
supports UIM coverage where the
recovery from the tortfeasor is inad-
equate to provide the insured com-
pensation for his or her injuries.
Finally, and most importantl¡
Bennett stands for the proposition
that "The public policy embodied in
these decisions is that an insurer may
not place in an insurance policy a
provision that defeats coverage fot
which the insurer has received valu-
able consider tlon."3o Consequentl¡
the courts should declare the use of
the'inartow" defìnition of an
underinsured motorist in Montana as
invalid as against public polic¡ be-
cause it provides an illusory UIM
coverage. As the Montana Supreme
Court said in Bennett, it is irrelevant
that UIM is not required by statute.
Those public policies still apply.31
Ttre "Reducing Clause's" Role in
Rendering tlre UIM C-overage
"IllusorJr"
Insurance Services Office, Inc.
(ISO), the trade organizaaon for the
property/ c sualty insurers, in its form
PP 03 11 06 94,32 couples the narrow
UIM defìnition with a "reducing
clause" that is added into the "Limit
of Liability" provision for that cover-
age. With regard to the limits of UIM
coverage uuáilublr, that clause pro-
vides as follows:
However, the limit of liability
shall be reduced by all sums
paid because of the "bodily
injury" by or on behalf of
persons or organizaions that
may be legally responsible. This
includes all sums paid under
Part A of this potcy.
Accordingl¡ Progressive's "reduc-
ing clause" reduces any UIM cover-
age benefìts available by all amounts
paid by the tortfeasot's insurance, The
threshold requirement for UIM cover-
age is that the tortfeasor has liatiility
insurance. Howevet, undet the reduc-
ing clause, that liabiJity insurance is
subtracted from the ]imit of UIM
coverage promised on the declan-
tions page. Consequentl¡ irr 1989, in
the $Øisconsin case of Wood.o, Am.
Fømíþ Mut. Ins. Co.,33 the court
found the reducing clause rendered
the UIM coverage "illusory" because
the insurer "wi)). neuer pay the policy
limits of its UIM policies."
And, it doesn't m^tter that the
insured recovers some, but not all of
the UIM benefit. InVood.,the UIM
coverage limit was $100,000, and the
liability limit subtracred was $25,000,
so that the insured netted $75,000 in
UIM benefits after the reduction.
However, because the insurer will
never have to p^y the frst $25,000 of
UIM coverage, the court held the
UIM coverage "illusory." As the NØis-
consin Supreme Court said n Kubn
u. Allstate Ins. Co.3a in 1993, the
"insured will receive some but never
all of the $50,000 coverage." There-
fore, in Kubn too, the court held such
a reducing clause "renders the pur-
ported $50,000 coverage illusory and
contrary to public policy." Applyt"g
the teasonable expectations test, the
court asked, "Is it reasonable for the
insured, who is sold $50,000 limits of
underinsured motorist coverage, to
expect never to qualify for the stated
limits? We think not."35 The court's
remedy was to hold that the
tortfeasor's liability limit would be
subtracted from the insured's total
damases not from the limits of the
UIM coverage, in essence changing
the UIM to a "broad" coveïage
definition to avoid the illusory coyer-
age result caused by the reducing
clause.36
In the companion case of Køun
a.Ind.us. Fire&Cøs. fns. Co.37
decided the same day, the court held
the reducing clause invalid on the
came grounds and applied the same
remedy. Alsq in Cbrístensen a.
Wøsøu fns. Co.,38 theMaryland
court said that to interpret UIM cov-
erage to deduct the liabiJity limits
from the UIM limits means "thatthe
victim cannot recover part of the
underinsurance limit he has bought
and paid for, and that portion of the
limits also would be illusory."3e That
policy had no definition of UIM, but
the narrow defìnition offered by the
insurer as the correct interpretation
was what the court was rejecting.
(I note here that in 1995, Wis-
consin enacted a statute expressly
permitting UIM reducing clauses.ao
Subsequently, Suk ølø u. II erÍt øge
Mut. Ins. Co.al followed the legisla-
tive enactment and necessarih di-
verged from the rule of lloglund.,
Wood. Kultn, and l(øun The Wis-
consin statute has no counterpart in
Montana, and those cases still contain
sound reasoning for treating negating
clauses in Montana.)
Incredibly, insurers defending the
narrow defìnition of UIM and its
companion reducing clause assert
that purchasers of $25,000 lirnits of
UIM only want to assure that they
have minimum limits of compensa-
tion available for their injuries and
that, if they receive that $25,000
from the BI coverage of the
tortfeasor, their expectation is satis-
fied. That argument is dead v/rong
and cannot withstand scrutiny. The
risk that a tortfeasor will only have
$25,000 minimum limits to compen-
sate the injured insuted is the exact
risk u¡hich the insured wanted to
avoid. UIM coverage appeared on
the market in Montana shortly after
the state enacted the Mandatory
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Liability Protection Act. That Act
required that each motor vehicle be
covered by $25,000 BI coverage
thereby rendering UM coverages
(some with limits of up to $500,000)
inappJicable. Insureds reahzed what a
disaster it would be if they were
seriously injured by a motor vehicle
covered by minimum limits, and the
market for UIM coverage was born.
No insured would buy $25,000 UIM
unless he or she expected that they
v¡ould receive it if the tortfeasor only
had $25,000 in BI covetage.
The "Reducing Clause" as
Subrogation Subiect to ttre "l.dade
Whole"Doctrine
If one analyzes the "reducing
clause" it is clear that, in essence, it is
nothing but subtogation the insurer
awards itself before the insured even
recovers from the tortfeasor. If the
UIM insurer inserted a subrogation
clause in Montana, it would be sub-
ject to the "made-whole" doctrine,
and the insurer likely would rlot re-
ceive any subrogation benefit. Under,
Skøuge a. Mt Støtes TeI & TeL
Co.,a2 and DeTí.enne As soc. u.
Fa.rmcrs AnionMut, Ins. Co,,a3 the
Montana Supteme Court has decreed
that the carner doesn't get paid back
until the insuted has been made
whole including costs and attorney
fees. Because tort la\¡/ doesn't tequire
toftfeasors to pay attorney fees, even
when they lose in court, thefe is little
likelihood of insuret reimbursement
by subtogation. The insurer's answer
to the fairness of the made-whole
doctrine is to draft and insert in UIM
coverage the "reducing clause" which
essentially says if the insured recov-
ers from the tortfeasor, we reduce the
money benefit we owe by the same
amount. Hence, the insurer receives
full subrogation without honoring the
made-whole rule.
In recognition of this reality, in
Iloescbenu. S.C. Ins. Co.,4the
Supreme Court of Minnesota applied
the principle that UIM coverage may
not be reduced by amounts paid by
one legally liable if that would pre-
vent the insured from being "made
whole." The sound public policy
underpinnings for the Made \X/hole
Doctrine set forth by this court in
Skøuge and DeTí.enne apply
equally as well to the reducing clause
in policies in Montana. If counsel
cannot convince the court to declare
the reducing clause invalid, he should
encourage courts in Montana to fol-
low the Minnesota Supreme Coutt in
making the reducing clause subject to
the Made Whole Doctrine.
The "Reducing Clause" as
Subiect to the "Comrnon Fund"
Doctrine
ln Mtntntøín We st Fønn Bu-
reøu Mut, Ins. Co. u. Iføllas rhe
Montana Supreme Court recognized
the common fund doctrine. Thete, it
made a hospital vzhich sought to
satisfy its $309,000 medical lien
from the plaintiff's $530,000 tort
recovery pay its proportionate share
of the plaintiff's attorney fees and
costs.a6
The court identifìed the "com-
mon fund" doctrine as an equìtable
exception to the ,\merican rule that a
party to a civil action is not entided
to attorney fees absent a specific
conftacrual or starutory ptovision
saying:
The "common fund" concept
provides that when 
^ 
p^tty
through active litigation cre-
ates, resefves or incteases a
fund, others sharing in the
fund must l¡ear a portion of
the litigation costs including
reasonable attotney fees. The
doctrine is employed to spread
the cost of litigation among all
benefìciaries so that the active
benefìciary is not forced to
bear the burden alone and the
"stranger" (i.e., passive) ben-
eficiaries do not receive their
benefits at not cost to them-
selves,
Subsequendy, the court followed
Høll n Fþnn a. Stø,te Compens ø-
tûon Ins. Fund.al where it made the
State Fund pay plaint-iff 's attorney
fees and costs when, puÍsuant to
statute, the fund reduced the
claimant's total permanent disability
benefìts by reason of his recovery of
Social Securitv disability benefits. The
court's test was whether there was
"an existing identifiable monetary
fund or benefìt in which an
ascertainable non-participatory ben-
eftciary maintains an interest," The
court equated the insurer's reduction
with receiving a monetary benefit
from the claimant's recovered fund.
Fþnn should have an important
application to reducing clauses in
general.
Logicall¡ if plaintiff's counsel
cannot defeat a reducing clause by
having it declared invalid or by hav-
ing it declared a form of subrogation
subject to the made whole docffine,
then, using the law of IIøll and
Fþlnn, the insuter's benefit under the
reducing clause should be subject to
the common fund doctrine. Conse-
quently, the carrier should pay its
proportionate share of plaintiff 's
contingent attorney fees and costs on
the amount of the reduction it enjoys.
C.ondusion
An auto insurer that uses the
"narÍow" UIM defìnition and couples
it with a "reducing clause" violates
public policy in Montana. The con-
flict between what the declarations
page promises and the UIM benefit
the policy will actually pay creates an
inherent ambiguity. The defìnition
and reducing clause violate the
consumer's expectations and defeat
the very purpose of UIM coverage
causing an injustice to the insured
who has been prudent enough to
putchase UIM coverage to guard
against the tortfeasor who carries
minimum limits. The minimum
$25,000 BI limit required in
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Montana's Mandatory Liability
Protection Act, MCA 561-6-301
and set forth in the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, MC,{
S61-6-103 et. seq., has never been
raised, and many believe it politi-
cally impossible to do so. Conse-
quentl)! the prudent insureds try to
protect themselves by purchasing
limits of UIM only to fìnd that
theit coverage is in whole or in part
often illusory even though they
have dutifully paid a separate pre-
mium for the coverage.
This is a matter of injustice in
insurance contracting, and it is
unnecessary. High volume insurers
like State Farm use the consumer
friendly "broa.d" UIM definition
and temain competitive. Counsel
must persuade the courts in Mon-
tana. to invalidate the narrow defi-
nition and its companion-reducing
clause to end the sale of "illu-
sory" UIM coverage to Montana
mototists. .
Eàdnotes
1. MatinJ, Huelsmann and Villiam G.
I(¡oebel, Undeùnsurcd MototisÍs: An Eaolu-
ing lrcararce Concern,lT No. I(entucky I-.
Rev 417, 427 (1990)
2. Pending Mont. Sup. Ct. Cause no. 02-488
3. Huelsmann & I(noebel, suþra n. L at 425
4. State Farm 1995 form8263
5. 185 Mont. 1.64,605 P.2d 166 (1980)
6. s44 N.E. 2d 488 (Ind. 1989)
7. 627 F.Supp. 1405 Q). Mont. 1986)
B. 30 M.F.R. 86 Q002)
9. 378 N.ìø2d 796 (À4inn. 1985)
1,0. Sæ id. at799
11.. See id. at 800
12. 500 N.\ø2d 354 (1993)
1,3. See id. at 356
"14. 261, Mont. 386, 862 P.2d 1146 (1993)
L5.542 N.E.2d 1351 (Ind.,{pp. 1989)
16. See id. at 1.354
1,7. Id.
18. s00 S.2d 1042 (ALa.1986)
L9. See id. at 1.044-45
20. 466 N.E.2d 1151,1157 (1984)
2L. 806 P.2d 438 (1991)
22. See id. at 440
23.780 P.2d 142, L43 (1989)
24. 283 CaL Rptt. 493, 496 (199'l)
25. 284 Mont. 372,945 P.2d 32 (1.997)
26. See id. at 37
27. 292 MonL 244, 970 P.2d 1054 (1998)
28. Bennett,261 Mont. at 386, 862 P.2d
at 11.46
29. 243 Mont. 125, 793 P.2d 253 (1990)





32. Miller's Standard Insurance Policies
Annotated, form P,{.P, Vol. 1, pp. 9-10
33. 436 N.\ø2d s94 CX/is. 1989)
34, 51,0 N.\ø2d 826 (!Øis. Âpp. 1993)
35. Kubn,510 N.\fl2d at831,
36. See id. at831
37. 436 N.\ü2d 321 CJ(/is. 1989)
38. 519 4.2d176 @ad. Äpp. 1987)
39. See id. at779
40. \X/is. Stat. g 632.32 (s)(i)
41..622 N.!ø2d 457 SVis. Àpp.2000)
42. 172 Mo¡t. 52'l-,565 P.2d 628 (1977)
43, 266 Mont. 184, 879 P.2ð.704 (1994)
44.378 N.\fl2d 796,799 (À4inn. 1985)
45. 2001 MÍ 31.4;308 Mont. 29; 38 P.3d 825
46. However, MCA 571-3-1114(1Xb) (1999)
as amended now provides that a hospital
lien is not Liable For attorney fees or costs
47. 312 Mont. 41.0 Q002)
**Æ:ï;::ï:@Òq..u,;ud "rQ¿
9dJ Experienced Legal video specialist & Documentary producer 
)â.S
NEWI OutPut 




www. monta n aherita ge. com
JOSH Productions
1001 E. Broadway #2-515
Missoula, MT 59802
Trrer Tnn¡ros - Wrxran 2OO3 Prcn37
